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garding the judgment excessive, went on to say that if plaintiff would
accept a remittirur of $48,000.00, it would affirm the judgment; otherwise,
it would be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Weygandt,
C. J., concurred in the judgment of reversal, but felt that any attempt to
cure the serious error by means of the process of remititur was improper
under the circumstances. His view seems commendably sound.
In Holt v. Hartschuk,5 following the rule of Bush v. Harvey Transfer
Co.,6 the court of appeals held that within the two-issue rule, contributory
negligence exists only where there is actionable negligence; 'therefore, a
judgment in a negligence action should be affirmed under the two-issue
rule where the issue of actionable negligence is erroneously submitted to the
jury although the issue of contributory negligence is submitted without
error intervening. On the issue of actionable negligence, the trial court
erred, in permitting plaintiff's witness, a physician, to give his opinion as to
the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries since it was based on records
and x-ray photographs made by others, none of which were offered in evi-
dence or properly identified and authenticated for admission.
CLINTON DEWITT
FUTURE INTERESTS
Litigation involving future interests is generally the result of defective
draftsmanship. This defective draftsmanship is usually caused by one or
more of the following deficiencies in the draftsman: (a) inadequate knowl-
edge of the law of future interests; (b) carelessness in the use of words; or
(c) incomplete knowledge of the future interests which the conveyer in-
tended to create. These deficiencies may be partially the result of inade-
quate judicial opinions in cases involving future interests.
A case that may mislead and confuse lawyers and judges is Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Andrus.' Although the holding of the Lorain County Court
of Appeals in this case is proper, the opinion of the court is inadequate and
misleading. Here the testator gave the residue of his estate upon the death
of his wife, the life beneficiary, as follows: a one-fifth undivided interest
to each of four named children and a one-fifth undivided interest to the
children of testator's deceased child; if any of testator's children died in the
meantime,
leaving heirs of their body, then the portion going to such deceased child
or children shall go to their children in equal shares and said trustee
'122 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio App. 1953)
1146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946)
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is to convey such. remainder of my estate to my children and
grandchildren aforesaid in the proportions hereinbefore set forth.
One of testator's sons survived the testator but predeceased the life bene-
ficiary leaving only the son's widow and no heirs of his body. The court
of appeals held that the son's undivided one-fifth of the remainder vested
at testators death and therefore when the son predeceased the life bene-
ficiary his interest as remainderman passed as part of his estate.
The question before the court consisted of two parts. First, was sur-
vival by the son to the time of his mother's death a condition precedent to
the vesting of the remainder in the son? Second, if the remainder vested
in the son at testator's death subject to divestment if the son predeceased his
mother leaving heirs of his body, was this vested remainder also subject
to divestment if the son predeceased his mother leaving no heirs of his
body? The court overlooked the second and more difficult part of the
question when it stated that the "sole question presented is the time of vest-
ing whether at the death of the testator, or at the termination of
the life interest."
If the draftsmen of future interest provisions and the courts do not have
a common understanding as to the test to be applied in distinguishing a
vested remainder from a contingent remainder, litigation and confusion
will probably result. For this reason, the Ohio courts should use a better
test than the one set forth in In re Hutchinson2 and relied upon by the court
of appeals in the Andus case. This inadequate test is as follows: "When
there is a person in being who would have the right to possession immedi-
ately upon the determination of the particular intervening estate, the
remainder is vested."
This inadequate and misleading test has -been traced3 to Fearne's Treat-
%se on Contngent Reazizders,4 Preston's Abstracts,5 and Butler and Har-
grave's Notes to Coke on LDttleton.6 The test as set forth by Fearne has
'been called fallacious by Austin.' It caused the Court of Appeals of New
York in Moore v Ltel8 to hold that a remainder to the heirs of a living
195 Ohio App. 503, 121 N.E.2d 68 (1953).
2 120 Ohio St. 542, 549, 166 N.E. 687, 690 (1929). The dictum in the Hutchinson
case that where two persons own property in common during their joint lives with
the survivor to take the entire property in fee simple, each owns a vested remainder
in the one-half interest of the other is the result of an improper test for determining
when a remainder is vested. See Note, 3 WEST. REs. L Ray. 60 (1951).
'1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 5 84 (1936).
'FBARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERs 216 (10th ed. 1844).
'2 PREsTON, ABSTRACTS 113 (3d ed. 1819).
'Co. Isrr. 265 a n. 2.
7AusTIN, JURIsPRUDENcE 895 (3d ed. 1869)
'41 N.Y. 66 (1869) It has been said the old Court of Appeals of New York was
1955)
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
person is vested. Some jurisdictions somewhat blindly followed this New
York decision, thereby introducing conflict and confusion into the law of
future interests of these jurisdictions.0 Professor Simes'0 and other out-
standing authorities' on the law of future interests have pointed out the
fallacies in the test. All courts of Ohio should reject this test as unsound and
misleading.
The holding in the Andrus case happens to be proper because under
accepted rules of construction,' 2 as well as under the defective tests used by
the court, the remainders to testator's named children are vested and because
under accepted rules of construction the death of the son prior to the death
of his mother and leaving no heirs of his body would not divest his re-
mainder, 3 a point which the court simply assumed was true if the remainder
vested at testator's death.
In Manley v. Crawford14 the provision of testator's will before the court
for construction reads as follows:
It is my will that after the death of my said wife, Martha E. Crawford,
that my estate both real and personal shall pass to and vest in equal parts
in my son Carl J. Crawford and my daughter Gladys Crawford Manley.
Should either of said children die before my deceased (sic) leaving chil-
dren the part of my estate that would have gone to such child if living shall
pass to and vest in the children of such deceased child. Should either of
my said children die prior to my decease without children it is my will that
such share as would have gone to such child had he or she been living
shall vest in the child that may be living or to the heirs of such child.
At testator's death he was survived by his widow, a daughter and a son. The
son predeceased his mother survived only by the son's widow. The son's
widow claimed the interest of her husband on the ground that it was not
divested at his death.
The Darke County Court of Appeals recognized the rule that "the law
favors the vesting of estates at the earliest possible moment in the ab-
sence of a dearly expressed intention to postpone the vesting to some
future time." The court also recognized that the question whether testator's
son had to survive to the death of his mother, the life tenant, "is not wholly
free from doubt," but it reversed the judgment of the court of common
replaced with a new court because it did not know the difference between a vested
and a contingent remainder. See Wheeler, More v. Littel and the Jackson Title, 1
COL. L. REv. 347, 350 (1901).
:0 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 86-92 (1936).
'See 1 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY 471 (1952); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 24
(3d ed. 1939)
'
2 See 1 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY 466 (1952); 1 SiMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 8
(1936); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 32 (3d ed. 1939)
" RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 254 (1940); 5 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY 163
(1952); 3 PAGE, WILLS 709 (1941); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 729 (1950)
4 94 Ohio App. 500, 116 N.E.2d 603 (1953)
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pleas and construed the will as requiring survivorship by the son to the
death of the life tenant as a condition precedent to his taking because
testator stated that after the death of his wife, his estate should vest in his
son and daughter.
The language which the court cites in support of its holding that the
son had to survive the life tenant to take is weak though the court states it
"can scarcely conceive of stronger language." The language is as follows:
"After the death of my said wife . my estate shall pass to and
vest. " The phrase "after -the death of my said wife" does not indicate
that the remainderman must survive to take. 5 Neither does the phrase
"shall pass to" reveal such an intent.' "Vese' is the only word that might
have been used to indicate a requirement of survivorship, but this use of the
word is doubtful because (a) it is used in connection -with "pass to, ' 1 7
(b) the words which follow it relate to distribution - "vest in equal parts,"
and (c) the word "vest" may mean vest in possession.' s
It is significant that the same phrase "shall pass to and vest id' was
used with respect to the children of the son or daughter if the son or
daughter predeceased the testator. With respect to these grandchildren -the
testator provided: "Should either of said children die -before my decease
leaving children the part of my estate that would have gone to such child if
living shall pass to and vest in the children of such deceased child." Would
a father want a remainder to vest at his death in the children of a deceased
child, but not to vest in his child if living at the father's death? Shouldn't
the court attach great significance to the fact that the references to death
of a child either leaving children or not leaving children specifically refer
to death before the testator's decease?
Another point in Manley v. Crawford9 which merits comment is that
the court stated that since the remainder to the son was contingent upon
his surviving the life -tenant there was a reversion which passed as intestate
property. Then the court proceeded to hold that upon the death of the
life tenant leaving the daughter surviving "the entire estate vested in the
daughter." The son survived the father and therefore he must have in-
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 157, comment 3; 5 AM. LAw OF PROPERTY 140
(1952); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 685 (1950); 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS
112 (1936).
"' See note 15, supra; Burney v. Arnold, 134 Ga. 141, 67 S.E. 712 (1910) (property
at death of life beneficiary "to go" to certain persons; phrase "to go" means "be pos-
sessed by").
'
7fBurney v. Arnold, supra note 16; Boyd v. Bartlett, 325 Mass. 206, 89 N.E.2d 772
(1950) ("vest and be paid over" read together as both referring to vest in posses-
sion).
' Jacobs v. Whitney, 205 Mass. 477, 91 N.E. 1009 (1910); It re Phillips' Estate,
205 Pa. 504, 55 Ad. 210 (1903); 44 WORDS AND PHRASES 151 (1940).
" 94 Ohio App. 500, 116 N.-.2d 603 (1953).
19551
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
herited this reversion with his mother and sister. The failure of -the court
to explain its holding -that the entire reversion vested in the daughter at the
son's death is unfortunate.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Franklin County
Probate Court in In re Miller's Estate20 although the probate court ignored
testator's express direction in his will that his executors deliver personal
property to his daughter, the life beneficiary, without requiring bond. The
probate court under its plenary powers properly and justifiably ordered the
executor to transfer the personal property to a trustee to manage it for the
life beneficiary and at her death to distribute it as the will provided among
the issue of the life tenant. This action was taken by the probate court be-
cause the life 'beneficiary was substantially insolvent after receiving and
spending about $450,000 in six years. There was no evidence that the
testator knew of the life beneficiary's spendthrift habits. The Ohio Court
of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court both approved of this acition by
the probate court.
In Morgan v. Reese2 the testator devised real property to a named
person for life, then, at death of the life beneficiary, to those persons who
at the death of the life beneficiary "are my legal heirs. " Testator died
in 1943. Testator's brother, who was an heir of testator, died in 1945
survived by a widow. The life beneficiary died in 1949. The persons
who would have been testator's heirs if he had died at the death of -the
life beneficiary 'believed that the widow of testator's brother was entitled to
one-fifth of the proceeds from the proceeds of the sale of the real property.
They therefore promised her one-fifth of the proceeds if she would join in
a contract to sell the real property and agree to sign a warranty deed to the
purchaser. The widow signed the contract and joined in the warranty
deed. When the parties to this arrangement with the widow were advised
by counsel that the widow had no interest in the real property because
testator's brother predeceased the life beneficiary, they refused to pay the
widow anything. The widow then sued to recover the amount promised
her. The Putnam Common Pleas Court held that there was no contract
between the widow and the persons who took as remaindermen. No cases
were cited in support of this holding because the court believed that "the
law is so plain that it does not require any citations."
The case of matter of Edward A. Coyle22 illustrates well the importance
of a knowledge of the general principles of future interests by the lawyers
who draft wills and by the judges and lawyers who must construe wills. In
the will which was before the Portage County Court of Appeals in the Coyle
2 160 Ohio St. 529, 117 N.E.2d 598 (1954)
21 116 N.E.2d 68 (Putnam Com. P1. 1953)
22 122 N.E.2d 115 (Ohio App. 1954).
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case the testator gave the residue of his estate to a trustee to pay the income
for the support of testator's son subject to the power of the trustee to use
any or all of the principal of the trust for this purpose if the income was
insufficient and also subject to the power in the trustee to give the son any
or all of the principal if the trustee determined that the son would not
waste it. After this gift to the son, the testator continued his residuary gift
as follows:
Whatever may be left, if any, in said trust fund at the time of the
death of my said son, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of his body.
If be shall not leave surviving hIm any heirs of his body, then what-
ever may be left in said trust fund, if any to my blood nieces and nephews,
share and share alike. If any of my said nephews or nieces should die
prior to the death of my said son, leaving surviving them heirs of his or
her body, their said heirs shall receive the portion of said trust fund which
said niece or nephew would have received, if living.
The question presented to the Probate Court of Portage County, in an
action to determine the highest amount of inheritance tax payable, was
whether the heirs of the body of the nieces or nephews received any future
interest. The probate court improperly held that the nieces and nephews
received a vested remainder subject to its being divested only upon the
death of the son leaving heirs of his body and that the heirs of the body of
the nieces and nephews received nothing. The probate court stated that
the heirs of the body of the nieces and nephews received nothing because the
gift to the nieces and nephews is in the language of an absolute gift!
The court of appeals properly reversed the d&cision of the probate court.
But the opinion of the court is authority only as to the specific issue that the
heirs of the body of the nieces and nephews received a future interest.
This gift of various future interests is deceptive in that ambiguities and
omissions may not be readily apparent. The trustee's power to use part or
all of the principal for the support of testator's son or to transfer it to the
son does not in itself make the remainders contingent. 3 But the remainder
in fee simple to the heirs of the body of the son is necessarily contingent
upon the death of the son survived by descendants, and for this reason
alone is a contingent remainder.2 4 The share of each heir of the body of
the son should be determined in accordance with the statute of intestate
succession in effect at the death of the son.2 5 Since the first and primary
remainder is contingent, the second and secondary remainder should also
be considered contingent.28  This construction avoids the troublesome
2RESTATEmrr, PRoPERTY § 276 (1940); I SiMmS, FuTuRE INTERmS 134
(1936).
"RFSTATEMErrN, PROPmTY § 249 (1940).
=1d. at § 310.
'Id. at § 278.
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question whether a contingent remainder can divest a vested remainder2 7
and also is in accordance with the form of the gift which is in the language
of a condition precedent - "if he shall not leave surviving him any heirs of
his body, then I give. " Yet, the court appeals, contrary to accepted
principles of construction, stated that "clearly the meces and nephews have
a remainder which vested at" testator's death.
The need to construe the remainder to the heirs of the body of the son
and the remainder to the nieces and nephews as contingent is not so obvious
in the Coyle case as it would be if the first remainder were to those heirs of
the body of the son who attain the age of thirty years and if the second re-
mainder were to the testator's nieces and nephews if no heirs of the body of
the son attain the age of thirty years. In such a gift the first remainder
would be void because it violates the rule against perpetuities and there-
fore the nieces and nephews might take if their remainder is called vested
even though the son was survived by heirs of his body.2"
The gift in the Coyle case to the nieces and nephews and to the heirs
of their bodies is certainly not a model which other draftsmen should fol-
low. It fails to provide specifically for situations which are likely to arise
in gifts to nieces and nephews and to the heirs of their -bodies. For example,
suppose one of testator's nieces or nephews died before testator executed his
will and this niece or nephew was survived by a child. If the life beneficiary
dies leaving no heirs of the body is this child of a deceased nephew entitled
under the will to take his parent's share?29
If one of testator's nieces or nephews was alive at the execution of the
will but predeceased the testator and this nephew or niece was survived by
a child, is this child entitled to take his parent's share under the will if the
life beneficiary dies leaving no heirs of the -body?"
If one of testator's nephews or nieces survives the testator but prede-
ceases the life beneficiary and this nephew or niece was survived by a child
who also predeceases the life beneficiary, did this child have an interest
under testator's will which would pass by testate or intestate succession
at the child's death?31
If one of testator's nieces or nephews survives the testator but prede-
ceases the life beneficiary leaving only a surviving spouse, did this de-
ceased nephew or niece have an interest under testator's will which would
pass by testate or intestate succession to the surviving spouse?2
1 SiMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 115, 132 (1936)
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 278, comment a (1940)
25 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY 398 (1952); 3 PAGE, WILLS 257 (1941); 2 SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS 197 (1936); OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.52.
s°5 AM. LAW OF PROPERTY 394 (1952); OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.52.
"RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 254, comment d, § 261 (1940); 5 AM. LAW OF
PROPERTY 151 (1952); 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 179 (1936)
2 See note 13, supra.
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In cases involving future interests there is often in addition to the usual
problem of determining the persons who take, the problem of determimng
the share that each of these persons takes. The gift of a future interest to
the heirs of the body of a named person as in the Coyle case and the gift to
the testator's children who are living at a stated time or their legal repre-
sentatives as in Boblett v. Barbee3 3 raise this problem of distribution.
There are three general ways to divide property among the owners of
future interests. These three general ways are (a) per stirpes, (b) per
capita, or (c) according to the statute of descent and distribution which
as to lineal descendants usually provides for per capita distribution when
all persons who take are related in the same degree to the testator or the
intestate and for a combination of per capita and per stirpes distribution
when all persons who take are not so related.34
In Boblett v. Barbee,35 the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
states that the issue is whether "the beneficiaries shall take per stirpes or
per capita." The beneficiaries are testator's eight grandchildren and four
great-grandchildren, the children of a deceased mnth grandchild. These
grandchildren and the children of a deceased grandchild are the descendants
of testator's four children. All four of testator's children survived the testator
but predeceased the life beneficiary. The gift in testator's will was to his
children living at the death of the life beneficiary or their legal repre-
sentatives. The phrase "their legal representatives" was apparently used in
the sense of heirs of the body.
Under a per stirpes distribution the testator's children would have been
the stipes. The court rejected this construction. Under a per capita dis-
tribution each grandchild and each great-grandchild would receive a one-
twelfth share. The court apparently thought it directed a per capita
distribution when it directed distribution of a one-ninth share to each
grandchild and a one-thirty-sixth share to each great-grandchild. But, this
distribution is in accordance with the statute of intestate succession in ef-
fect at the time for distribution and is a combination of per capita and
per stirpes distribution. For the draftsman the important point to remem-
ber is that the phrase per capita may be used by draftsmen or by courts to
mean equality of distribution among all beneficiaires or equality among
all members of a class with the descendants of a deceased member taking his
or her share. Also the phrase per stirpes may be ambiguous when it is
not dear as to which class is the stock or stirpes.
ROBERT N. COOK
119 N.E.2d 319 (Franklin Corn. PL 1954).
"See White, Per Stirpes or Per Capta, 13 U. OF CiN. L. REy. 298 (1939); Page,
Descent Per Strpes and Per Capita. [1946] Wis. L. REV. 3.
:' 119 N.E.2d 319 (Franklin Corn. Pl. 1954).
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